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Discussion after the Speech of Jack 0. Haley
QUESTION, Professor King: Would you comment on the experience of
U.S. lawyers in Japanese courts?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: The new regulations simply bring American law-
yers into a regulated system which licenses them to do what they other-
wise could have done without the license, if they had been given a visa or
been allowed to enter the country. I think the issues are visa issues, not
licensing issues, in terms of negotiating with the Japanese government.
The experience of American firms has been, and the future experi-
ence will be, beneficial to the American lawyer but not to the Japanese
lawyer. Japanese lawyers will continue to have a monopoly on offering
legal services, and non-legal, law related services to foreign clients in Ja-
pan. But an American firm with an office in Japan will be able to provide
a significant degree of Japanese law related counseling for its U.S. clients
or other non-Japanese clients in New York City, Cleveland, Chicago, San
Francisco, or Los Angeles, but not in Tokyo; even though much of the
information is coming out of Tokyo. Also, there will clearly be contact
between American counsel in Tokyo and representatives of their basic
clients who happen to be in Tokyo at the same time. Therefore, I am not
sure that the Japanese lawyers will be able to exercise that full monopoly
that they believe the new law will insure.
QUESTION, Mr. Smith: Could you examine the ways in which the
United States relates to Japan, and make comparisons, or contrasts that
we ought to be drawing in terms of those relationships?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: The area I know best in terms of comparisons
concerns how the Canadians have related to Japan in the forestry indus-
try. The Canadians have been much more effective in selling their prod-
uct in Japan than has the United States. The success can be attributed to
the long-term activities of very effective representatives in Tokyo, under-
standing the market, and making sure that the information about that
market was communicated to potential suppliers.
There are some areas where I think both Canada and the United
States have failed. These failures are in areas in which there are cultural
differences. Until very recently, we have not taken Japan seriously. Ja-
pan was a world power and an economic power prior to World War II.
It simply reemerged in the post-World War II era.
QUESTION, MR. Whitehill: Could you speak more on the congestion
in Japanese court dockets and how negotiators resolve financial disagree-
ments in Japan. Are they willing to accept ADR provisions in a
contract?
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ANSWER, Mr. Haley: There is no question that the Japanese prefer not
to take their disputes to court. But I think that is also true in Canada
and the United States. The studies I have seen of Canadian and U.S.
businesses show that they prefer to resolve differences through a process
of negotiation between the parties. If negotiations between the parties
fail, third parties are brought in to provide either mediation, to facilitate
negotiations, or to provide different leverage. Likewise, Japanese busi-
nesses prefer negotiation. They prefer it for the same reasons that were
described this morning in terms of government-to-government negotia-
tions. They do not want to give up their sovereignty, their individual
independence or autonomy, or their control over the decisions that they
are making. Adjudication always, whether it is arbitration or litigation,
means giving up that control to a third-party. Therefore, the Japanese do
not like to arbitrate. Arbitration is almost unheard of in domestic dis-
putes. It is a foreign import that is used almost exclusively in terms of
international commercial relationships.
When the Japanese perceive there is something to be gained by liti-
gation, they will litigate.
The difficulty in Japan is that most business relationships are ongo-
ing, continuing relationships and no one files suit in those cases.
QUESTION, Professor King: What about the objectivity of the Japanese
courts toward foreign parties?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: There are studies about Japanese courts and
judges and how they respond to foreign parties. These studies are unani-
mous in their conclusion that Japanese judges tend to be, if anything,
favorable to the foreign party. The Japanese complaint is that the judges
go out of their way to be fair to the foreign party and in doing so, they
end up to some degree being slightly unfair to the Japanese party.
It is clear that the rules that are being litigated in many cases, par-
ticularly regulatory rules, tend to favor the Japanese side. If the case is
not in court, but before an administrative agency, it must be expected
that the administrative agency is pursuing certain policies, and that it is
enforcing those policies. To the extent that those policies coincide with
the interest of a Japanese firm with whom the foreign parties are dealing,
it is likely that the agency will favor the Japanese firm to that extent.
QUESTION, Mr. Robinson: I have heard it alleged that there is a struc-
tural discriminatory practice in Japan concerning prospective intellectual
property, in particular, patent applications. For example, foreign patent
applications are put on the shelf and delayed. If this is true, is there any
remedy? What can one do? Who can you complain to?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: If it is true, the remedy is to do exactly what the
people in Seattle did when the City of Victoria dumped its sewage into its
lovely sound. People should run to put it in the newspaper, and should
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scream and holler. We should quickly go to the U.S. government and
say, "You better do something. Look how unfair it is."
I have spent some time looking at this issue of intellectual property
protection and the allegations against Japan for a variety of unfair prac-
tices. My conclusion is that, yes, there may be an isolated case or two of
discriminatory practice. Texas Instruments is the case people often point
to but I think that is an exceptional case. The Japanese system is like the
European system. It is a system in which legal protection is given the
moment you file. It is not from the moment the patent is granted. Your
legal protection is confirmed once the patent is granted. So if there is a
difference in the scope, there are some risks that you take.
I think the patent system, generally as a legal issue, is fair. I do not
think there is really any serious problem. But difficulties arise in how the
Japanese use it, the competitiveness of the system, and the lack of effec-
tive enforcement power - particularly injunctive relief. The Japanese
tend to negotiate, and to get cross-licensing. Therefore, there is more
competition which prevents the monopoly position that would ordinarily
be expected.
COMMENT, Mr. Siber: There is no evidence that the patent office is
discriminating by setting things aside. However, there are distortions in
the Japanese patent systems that cause problems. The Texas Instrument
case is an example.
The Japanese system has a post-rank opposition practice so that you
can approach the application before it is granted. If an industry is gang-
ing-up on applicants and sequentially opposing one after another, there is
certainly a lot of time before the patent is ultimately granted.
There are also other digressions, such as the inability to get an in-
junction. This is true not only for patents, but also for civil litigation. It
is almost impossible to get an injunction, and that is a serious problem.
The other problem that the Japanese patent system poses is that the
courts interpret patents extremely narrowly, which means that if you are
an American or Canadian patent owner, you cannot expect the same
kind of protection in Japan as you might expect in your home country.
It pays to study the system and learn how to use it.
One last distortion is the exceedingly large number of applications
that Japanese companies fie. There are 500,000 applications filed in Ja-
pan every year. There is no way that the patent office can deal with such
a large number of applications, which means it can take many years to
get a patent license.
COMMENT, Mr. Haley: I guess I worry somewhat about the use of the
word distortion because what you are describing is part of the domestic
system. The foreign company is operating under more or less the same
terms the Japanese companies operate under; the Japanese also experi-
ence the lack of injunction to relieve the basic system. It is only a distor-
tion if you consider the Canadian-U.S. practice to be the norm. We are
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not really the international norm. The European practice is closer to
that.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: Can the same things that you said about Japan
be said about the Asian system, or must certain distinctions be made?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: The two systems that I know best are Taiwan
and South Korea. Both were introduced to Western legal institutions as
their contemporary legal systems were imposed upon them by Japan.
They were both colonies; Taiwan from 1895, Korea from 1910. Both
countries have continued to look very closely at what the Japanese do. It
is not uncommon to find a statute that is introduced in Japan several
years later introduced with some changes in both South Korea and Tai-
wan. The basic preferences for mediation and negotiation as opposed to
adjudication are the same. The most striking difference between both
South Korea and Taiwan and Japan is the extent to which the system
enables or enforces a cohesion within corporate groups - the corporate
group in the sense of both the firm and the neighborhood. In South Ko-
rea and in Taiwan, the family and the extended family are far more sig-
nificant than they are in Japan. In both South Korea and Taiwan there is
not a single firm that is not dominated by a family, with a son-in-law,
first son, or second son, as the president of this subsidiary and the presi-
dent of that subsidiary, etc. Also the firms are not run by professional
managers in either Taiwan and Korea.
From an Asian prospective, Japan seems quite western, quite litig-
ious. Japan uses legal institutions much more readily than the Asians. It
is only from our prospective that Japan looks very Asian.
QUESTION, Mr. Reifsnyder: The Japanese, and Japanese companies in
particular, seem to be looking to establish a long-term relationship with
corporate counsel or American lawyers. They also want to find people
who are willing to pursue things sequentially as opposed to over-lawyer-
ing. They also want to get good value for the money invested.
The problem is that when they enter the U.S. legal establishment
they find people are willing to go for the jugular faster than they are
willing to, and that the fees reflect the amount of time and effort
committed.
Are there any particular kinds of cases or areas where the Japanese
tend to be more prone to litigate than North Americans?
ANSWER, Mr. Haley: To answer that question the calculation is how
many disputes are there that could be litigated and what proportion of
those disputes end up in court as opposed to not ending up in court. For
example, most litigation in Japan, indeed most criminal actions in Japan,
involve automobile accidents. Why do these get into court as opposed to
commercial contract disputes? There are a lot of commercial contract
disputes in Japan.
How do you explain that? First, automobile accidents are disputes
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between strangers. The reasons for negotiating, mediating and reaching
a settlement are different when negotiating with a stranger then if negoti-
ating with someone that you will have to deal with for the next ten years.
When dealing with friends, both parties want to reach a solution without
going to court. Another factor is that in automobile litigation, there is a
lot of litigation, therefore, the rules of litigation in this area are clear.
Next, it should be remembered that very few cases proceed to litiga-
tion either here or in Japan. In the United States, less than 10 percent of
all disputes ever get to court. The Japanese probably have even a lower
percentage. Because there are enough cases that do go to court, the Japa-
nese know pretty well what the courts will do. Japanese judges publish
their findings. If you have a loss of life because of an automobile acci-
dent, and there is fault with no comparable fault on the other side, they
will use actuarial tables to determine what it is worth, and that is what
you will get.
Why go to court when the insurance company will settle? They will
settle for an amount which represents a discount for the cost of going to
court.
However, the Japanese believe that they are non-litigious. They be-
lieve this is particularly true compared to the United States.
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